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With all developed countries and some 140 emerging markets reporting outward FDI (OFDI) 
stocks in 2017, the question arises what policy actions, if any, home country governments 
should take to support their firms investing abroad. As OFDI potentially benefits home 
economies by improving firms’ access to markets and resources of all kinds, the challenge 
consists in increasing their international competitiveness and bringing capabilities back home.  
 
Hence, all developed countries support their outward investors in various ways, including by 
granting specific advantages to home country firms.1 But most emerging markets have not done 
so yet. Still, they face the challenge of considering policies and measures to ensure that this 
situation does not put their firms at a competitive disadvantage. This will lead to an escalating 
OFDI-incentive competition (mirroring the “bidding-wars” on the inward FDI side) that, 
ultimately, helps no country.  
 
The most problematic OFDI incentives are financial and fiscal measures. These include, e.g., 
grants, loans, financial guarantees, and specific tax exemptions. Their proliferation raises 
several issues. 
  
 An escalation of OFDI-incentive competition can lead to a misallocation of public funds 
and wasteful “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies. This is particularly challenging for 
countries with limited resources. 
 
 The increased international competitiveness of specific firms does not always translate 
into positive effects in home countries, e.g., when MNEs do not repatriate earnings. 
Actually, the more firms internationalize through FDI, the smaller—potentially—the 
overlap between their global corporate interests and the national interests of the 
countries in which they are headquartered. 
 
 Possibilities for abuse exist. MNEs may engage in “OFDI-incentives shopping,” as the 
definition of a “domestic” firm is not always clear. 2  Foreign firms could rout 
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investments through countries with generous OFDI incentives, leaving them without the 
desired OFDI benefits.  
 
 OFDI incentives affect competitive neutrality, i.e., the promotion of a level playing field 
for competition among firms. This concern has mostly been raised in the context of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—which possess various advantages vis-à-vis private 
firms—but could be extended to OFDI incentives in general. Indeed, governments 
distort competition in the world FDI market when introducing measures to support the 
international expansion of their firms, thereby placing them in a more advantageous 
position vis-à-vis firms from countries that do not receive the same help from their 
governments. 
 
Two complementary solutions offer themselves: 
 
 Governments supporting their outward investors should at least focus any aid on 
projects that directly benefit domestic economic development (as, e.g., China does). 
 
 Discussions on an international framework for OFDI incentives should be initiated. As 
OFDI incentives are applied unilaterally, only a multilateral (or regional) approach can 
prevent governments from outbidding each other by offering incentive packages to their 
outward investors.  
 
Admittedly, seeking a OFDI-incentives agreement is a long-shot, given the past failure to reach 
an international agreement constraining inward FDI-incentive competition. Yet, three 
considerations support action:  
 
 Importantly, since most governments do not back their domestic outward investors with 
incentives yet, they have a self-interest in a preemptive agreement, to avoid having to 
join a costly incentive competition.  
 
 Governments increasingly recognize the wasteful effects of inward FDI-incentive 
competition. This rationale also applies to OFDI incentives. The European Commission 
has begun to take action, in reference to state-aid rules and the distortion of 
competition.3  
 
 Governments are beginning to address issues related to competitive neutrality and SOEs 
in treaties, e.g., in Chapter 17 of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership.  
 
Discussions on limiting OFDI incentives could be sponsored by the World Association of 
Investment Promotion Agencies (with some supportive countries?), as its members should have 
an interest in this matter.  
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An international framework on OFDI incentives could emulate the “traffic light” approach of 
the WTO’s Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement.4 It could first require increased 
transparency and eventually discipline the most harmful incentives, starting with capping 
specific financial incentives. However, exceptions could cover incentives encouraging FDI 
flows to least developed countries, sustainable FDI flows and SME OFDI.  
 
A build-in agenda could provide for a gradual approach for emerging markets still in the process 
of liberalizing OFDI. This would allow these economies’ domestic outward investors to catch 
up with their competitors from developed countries, which typically benefitted from OFDI 
incentives when establishing themselves abroad.  
 
Absent a preemptive multilateral or regional approach, all governments will eventually engage 
in OFDI-incentive competition, lest their firms face a competitive disadvantage. This would 
lead to the adoption of costly measures not necessarily benefiting domestic development—a 
missed opportunity. 
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